Friday, May 11, 2012

Analyzing Procurement Contract Risks


Analyzing Procurement Contract Risks
Supply Chain Case Study on: “Identifying Contract Risks and Contingency Planning”
by Jimmy Alyea

This case study’s thesis is that “the Defense Supply Center Columbus (DSCC) was justified in terminating for default an indefinite-delivery purchase order (IDPO) contract at a firm fixed price (FFP) when New Era Contract Sales (New Era) failed to supply coupling tubes as required by a June 29, 2006, delivery order.

Contract performance.
When New Era, a government contractor, made delivery on a July 6, 2004, IDPO received from DSCC for coupling tubes, a contract was formed.  The contract obligated New Era to supply parts for two years at a firm fixed price.  New Era’s pricing to DSCC was based on a two-year quote from its supplier, Harrison.  New Era’s contract with DSCC contained a standard supply contract default clause but no price adjustment clause.

When New Era received DSCC’s second IDPO on June 30, 2006, it found that Harrison had been sold and its new owner would not honor the original price quote.  On July 5, 2006, New Era asked DSCC to cancel its contract with no liability for either party because its supplier refused to honor the quoted pricing due to an increase in material costs.  When DSCC refused, New Era asked to negotiate a new price based on a new supplier’s higher price quote.  DSCC again refused and terminated the contract for default when New Era did not fill the order.  New Era appealed the decision to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) based on the provisions of the default clause, Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 52.249-8.
          
FAR 52.249-8.  
The clause stated DSCC’s default contract rights but provided an exception for contractor liability if the following occurred: “If the failure to perform is caused by the default of a subcontractor at any tier, and if the cause of the default is beyond the control of both the Contractor and subcontractor, and without the fault or negligence of either . . . .unless the subcontracted supplies or services were obtainable from other sources in sufficient time for the Contractor to meet the required delivery schedule.”

New Era’s opposing view of the thesis.
New Era believes that its nonperformance is excusable under FAR 52.249-8.  The refusal of its subcontractor’s new owner to honor the original price quoted to New Era was “beyond its [New Era’s] control and without its fault or negligence.”  Similarly, the subcontractor’s refusal to perform was also “beyond its [the subcontractor’s] control and without its fault or negligence” because Harrison had quoted an unusually low price two years ago and because the present cost of titanium had increased dramatically.  As a result, New Era’s subcontractor would have only been able to supply product from its distributor at a cost/unit of more than three times the original contract price.  New Era states that as a small business owner, it could not absorb the resulting $23,904.66 loss.

New Era also asserts that it had taken “all reasonable action” to perform the contract by looking for alternative sources from which to obtain the product in time to meet the contract delivery date.  However, since none of these alternative suppliers carried stock of the needed item and produced only on an “as-needed basis,” this option would not have enabled New Era to deliver in a timely manner.  Although DSCC offered to extend the delivery date in exchange for a $510.18 contract price reduction, New Era believed it should not have had to incur this extra cost because DSCC did not respond for eight months to New Era’s request to cancel the contract without liability because it could not perform.

Because these unforeseen circumstances regarding pricing and product availability were beyond its control, New Era asserts that it was not negligent in its nonperformance of DSCC’s June 29, 2006, order and should be discharged without liability from its contract with DSCC.

DSCC’s supporting view of the thesis.
New Era entered into a binding IDPO contact when it fulfilled DSCC’s July 6, 2004 delivery order, obligating itself to honor the offered prices for two years.  As the FFP contract contained no price adjustment clause, New Era accepted the risk of increased prices from its subcontractor.  Thus, New Era’s claim that a price increase was beyond both it and its subcontractor’s control was not a basis on which to abandon performance under the contract’s default clause.  New Era and its subcontractor did not take “all reasonable action” to perform because they could have provided the ordered parts, even though at a loss.

DSCC seeks affirmation from ASBCA of its decision to terminate New Era’s contract for default and to recover costs from having to reprocure from a new source.  The Board found New Era in default of the contract and affirmed DSCC’s actions and request for reimbursement for additional procurement costs.  The Board stated that renegotiating a contract because of a supplier’s price increase would defeat the purpose of a firm-fixed-price contract, which was to protect DSCC from price variations.  It also noted that DSCC had grounds for termination when New Era notified it on July 5, 2006, that it could not make delivery on DSCC’s second order.

Implications.
Lessons for contract managers include the importance of protecting against contract risk and of making contingency plans.  New Era should have taken the time to understand the contract terms, particularly the implications of filling the first order of an IDPO contract at a FFP, as well as the consequences of default and the lack of a price escalation clause.   It should have also locked its supplier into a contractual agreement as to pricing and the subcontractor’s liability for default, instead of depending solely upon a price quote.  New Era would have ultimately been better off had it performed the contract at a loss and then brought suit against its supplier.  Good advice for contract managers would be to expect the best but plan for the worse, and when in doubt, seek legal advice quickly before a problem escalates.

Copyright 2012 James L. Alyea. All Rights Reserved.

Case Study Reference:
“IDENTIFYING CONTRACT RISK AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING” by Jack Horan, Contract Management, Aug., 2009. Retrieved from http://www.mckennalong.com/media/site_files/1140_August%202009.pdf

Wednesday, May 2, 2012

Analysis of: “Purchasing’s Performance as Seen by its Internal Customers"


“Purchasing’s Performance as Seen by its Internal Customers:
A Study in a Service Organization”


SERVQUAL is a “gap” survey model that defines service quality by the difference or “gap” between what customers feel a service should offer (their expectations) and their perceptions  of the actual performance, based on five service quality dimensions:  reliability, responsiveness, assurance, empathy, and tangibles.  If the numerical score on a generic Likert-type scale for perceptions meets or exceeds the score for expectations, the customer service experience is considered positive.  Conversely, negative numbers indicate improvement is needed.  Service quality measured in this way is an attitude or a value judgment of a service rather than an objective assessment based on measurable standards.

Purpose. 
Service quality as seen by external customers of an organization has been a focus of research since the 1980s.  The SERVQUAL survey instrument was developed using 22 items describing five service quality dimensions to determine service characteristics that are important to “external”  customers of retail businesses.  Limited research had been done on using the SERVQUAL model to study the service quality experienced by “internal” customers of an organization. This research study is important because of the increasing emphasis on the benefits of Total Quality Management (TQM).  This article describes a study to determine if SERVQUAL’s five dimensions of service quality are useful in measuring the qualities of service provided to  internal customers in the purchasing department of a service organization.

Research method. 
To determine if the SERVQUAL model holds true for internal customers, 132 questionnaires, describing 22 service-quality characteristics, were sent to internal customers of the purchasing department of a major university in the Midwest.  The response rate was 61 percent or 80 usable questionnaires.   Respondents rated the overall importance of the five service quality dimensions, and then were asked to rate each individual characteristic of the five qualities for an “ideal” purchasing department and for the university’s purchasing department.  The difference between the two was calculated to determine the service gap score of each item.   Both a mean gap score for individual characteristics and a gap score, each weighted by the overall dimension importance to the respondents,  were obtained.

Results. 
The authors’ initial results indicate that all five dimensions apply to internal as well as external customers and can be useful to purchasing department managers to identify  “perceived” shortcomings of the department.   The results of the individual items assessed for an ideal purchasing department generally corresponded to the respondents’ overall assessment of the importance of each the five service quality dimensions.  Reliability is identified as the most important dimension with a 33 percent mean score, followed by responsiveness at 23 percent; assurance, 20 percent; empathy, 15 percent; and tangibles, 9 percent.  A comparison of the respondents’ expectations of an “ideal” department’s service characteristics with their perceptions of the “actual” service delivered showed a “service gap” for all characteristics.  However, the scores are toward the positive end of the scale, indicating that overall most internal customers felt that the department was doing a reasonably good job in meeting their service needs.

Conclusions. 
Cautions and questions about using the SERQUAL instrument by a purchasing  department to obtain service feedback from internal customers include defining what score  constitutes an acceptable gap and what actions may be taken to close an unacceptable one, as well as setting a general tolerance level cutoff for service items that need to be improved.  Previous service quality surveys may be used to help establish a tolerance level and a benchmark.  The process for interpreting the results should be clearly defined and a schedule set for regular review of service quality using SERVQUAL along with more traditional survey formats.  These decisions should be made before the SERVQUAL instrument is administered, keeping in mind that even the best departments may never be able to achieve the “ideal.”



Contact Jimmy Alyea:

Case Study Reference:

“Purchasing's Performance as Seen by its Internal Customers:  A Study in a Service Organization”
by Joyce A. Young and Dale L. Varble,  Aug., 1997
International Journal of Purchasing and Materials Management


Sunday, March 18, 2012

Supply Chain Management

Supply Chain Management, Logistics, and Procurement Research
by Jimmy Alyea

Procurement Contracts:

Supply Chain Analysis:  Nissan
 
Supply Chain Analysis:  Nokia vs. Ericsson

 Distribution and Logistics:  Wal-Mart

E-Business Distribution and Logistics:  Amazon.com

Sales, Distribution, and Logistics:  Wal-Mart

Logistics:  The Perfect Order

Distribution and Logistics:  Cross-docking

Inventory Management:
 
Supply Chain Analysis:  Collaboration
 
Supply Chain Analysis:  Profitability

Supply Chain Analysis:  Outsourcing
"The Pros & Cons of Outsourcing in Supply Chain Management"

Supply Chain Analysis:  Off-Shoring and Outsourcing

Supply Chain Analysis:  Near Sourcing

Supply Chain Analysis:  Flexibility
 

Copyright 2012 James L. Alyea. All Rights Reserved.

Contact Jimmy Alyea:

Saturday, March 10, 2012

Supply Chain Flexibility


Case Study Summary by Jimmy Alyea

Customer expectations in the online retail world are presenting supply chain professionals with a paradox, e.g., “how to do more for less.”  Today’s e-commerce customers are able to access an unlimited number and variety of products that they expect to be shipped quickly and free.  In order to stay relevant and profitable, many online retailers face the complex challenge of having to build or reorganize supply chain infrastructures that are flexible enough to meet the ever-growing expectations of consumers.  This commitment to customer satisfaction is hindered by rapid growth of online retail sales and unpredictable consumer demand due to ongoing financial uncertainty.  The dilemma of retailers is to balance these drivers against a central priority of reducing or controlling supply chain costs.

Keeping the customer happy. 
Raised consumer expectations of faster, free delivery and increased cross-channel services puts pressure on e-commerce retailers to provide more for less to differentiate a brand and stay competitive.  One low-cost solution is to implement process mapping of the order cycle to look for time inefficiencies in each element of the delivery process.  A more capital-intensive option is to put additional distribution nodes in the network.  Raised customer expectations also present retailers with the challenge of providing seamless cross-channel services.  The key to successfully transferring brand experience between channels is to have the visibility and business intelligence tools necessary to coordinate the interaction in a cost-efficient way.  Failure to implement initiatives to meet customers’ perceived standards can negatively impact sales, but fulfilling them is not without risk.

Negotiating peaks and valleys.   
To successfully meet customer demand, online retailers must be able to negotiate the differences between peak and off-peak demand.   Although many feel competent to handle predictable peaks and dips, they are challenged to handle demand volatility caused by the impact of economic uncertainty.  Rapid shifts in consumer confidence, combined with the lengthy time delay from when forecasts are made, highlight the importance of supply chain agility.  Retailers can either over-stock or under-stock, but they must be adequately prepared to minimize the risks of doing so.  This would include utilizing relevant supply chain metrics, close collaboration between sales and operations planning, and seeking collaborative opportunities with other retailers.  Such collaboration can be facilitated by third-party logistics companies that provide access to shared-use facilities.

Finding a flexible structure. 
The online retailers interviewed were focused on a long-term growth strategy as part of their supply chain plans.  Redesigning the retail supply chain provides the opportunity to build flexibility into the structures and processes needed to grow, as well as the means to get closer to the customer.  One way to do this is to utilize shared-use facilities which can provide cost efficiency and agility to support peak management and demand fluctuations.  To be viable, providers of shared-used facilities need to offer customizable services to facilitate retailers’ control of order cycle times and the delivery experience.  Online retailers must also have the right systems in place to allocate stock efficiently between channels and to reduce cross-channel conflicts and the impact of sudden demand peaks in one channel.

Conclusion. 
Expanding a retail business in the growing e-commerce world requires aligning and integrating traditional and e-commerce channels and systems to meet customer expectations.  As customers increasingly expect fast, free delivery and seamless cross-channel services, retailers are striving to meet these demands in order to stay competitive.  Growing retailers without an established network must decide whether to make internal adjustments to their supply chain structure or outsource to a third-party logistics provider.  They must also deal with uncertain economic times and rapidly changing technology.  With a goal of flexibility, outsourcing provides immediate gains in speed, agility, and scalability of facilities and people.  Making the right decisions at the supply chain level helps increase turnaround times, balance seasonal fluctuation, and provide a supply chain infrastructure that facilitates rapid growth.

Copyright 2012 James L. Alyea. All Rights Reserved.


Case Summary Reference:
www.exel.com

Saturday, February 25, 2012

Identifying Procurement Contract Risk


This case study’s thesis is that “the Defense Supply Center Columbus (DSCC) was justified in terminating for default an indefinite-delivery purchase order (IDPO) contract at a firm fixed price (FFP) when New Era Contract Sales (New Era) failed to supply coupling tubes as required by a June 29, 2006, delivery order.

Contract performance. 
When New Era, a government contractor, made delivery on a July 6, 2004, IDPO received from DSCC for coupling tubes, a contract was formed.  The contract obligated New Era to supply parts for two years at a firm fixed price.  New Era’s pricing to DSCC was based on a two-year quote from its supplier, Harrison.  New Era’s contract with DSCC contained a standard supply contract default clause but no price adjustment clause.

When New Era received DSCC’s second IDPO on June 30, 2006, it found that Harrison had been sold and its new owner would not honor the original price quote.  On July 5, 2006, New Era asked DSCC to cancel its contract with no liability for either party because its supplier refused to honor the quoted pricing due to an increase in material costs.  When DSCC refused, New Era asked to negotiate a new price based on a new supplier’s higher price quote.  DSCC again refused and terminated the contract for default when New Era did not fill the order.  New Era appealed the decision to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) based on the provisions of the default clause, Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 52.249-8.
           
FAR 52.249-8.   
The clause stated DSCC’s default contract rights but provided an exception for contractor liability if the following occurred: “If the failure to perform is caused by the default of a subcontractor at any tier, and if the cause of the default is beyond the control of both the Contractor and subcontractor, and without the fault or negligence of either . . . .unless the subcontracted supplies or services were obtainable from other sources in sufficient time for the Contractor to meet the required delivery schedule.”

New Era’s opposing view of the thesis. 
New Era believes that its nonperformance is excusable under FAR 52.249-8.  The refusal of its subcontractor’s new owner to honor the original price quoted to New Era was “beyond its [New Era’s] control and without its fault or negligence.”  Similarly, the subcontractor’s refusal to perform was also “beyond its [the subcontractor’s] control and without its fault or negligence” because Harrison had quoted an unusually low price two years ago and because the present cost of titanium had increased dramatically.  As a result, New Era’s subcontractor would have only been able to supply product from its distributor at a cost/unit of more than three times the original contract price.  New Era states that as a small business owner, it could not absorb the resulting $23,904.66 loss.

New Era also asserts that it had taken “all reasonable action” to perform the contract by looking for alternative sources from which to obtain the product in time to meet the contract delivery date.  However, since none of these alternative suppliers carried stock of the needed item and produced only on an “as-needed basis,” this option would not have enabled New Era to deliver in a timely manner.  Although DSCC offered to extend the delivery date in exchange for a $510.18 contract price reduction, New Era believed it should not have had to incur this extra cost because DSCC did not respond for eight months to New Era’s request to cancel the contract without liability because it could not perform.

Because these unforeseen circumstances regarding pricing and product availability were beyond its control, New Era asserts that it was not negligent in its nonperformance of DSCC’s June 29, 2006, order and should be discharged without liability from its contract with DSCC. 

DSCC’s supporting view of the thesis. 
New Era entered into a binding IDPO contact when it fulfilled DSCC’s July 6, 2004 delivery order, obligating itself to honor the offered prices for two years.  As the FFP contract contained no price adjustment clause, New Era accepted the risk of increased prices from its subcontractor.  Thus, New Era’s claim that a price increase was beyond both it and its subcontractor’s control was not a basis on which to abandon performance under the contract’s default clause.  New Era and its subcontractor did not take “all reasonable action” to perform because they could have provided the ordered parts, even though at a loss.

DSCC seeks affirmation from ASBCA of its decision to terminate New Era’s contract for default and to recover costs from having to reprocure from a new source.  The Board found New Era in default of the contract and affirmed DSCC’s actions and request for reimbursement for additional procurement costs.  The Board stated that renegotiating a contract because of a supplier’s price increase would defeat the purpose of a firm-fixed-price contract, which was to protect DSCC from price variations.  It also noted that DSCC had grounds for termination when New Era notified it on July 5, 2006, that it could not make delivery on DSCC’s second order. 

Implications. 
Lessons for contract managers include the importance of protecting against contract risk and of making contingency plans.  New Era should have taken the time to understand the contract terms, particularly the implications of filling the first order of an IDPO contract at a FFP, as well as the consequences of default and the lack of a price escalation clause.   It should have also locked its supplier into a contractual agreement as to pricing and the subcontractor’s liability for default, instead of depending solely upon a price quote.  New Era would have ultimately been better off had it performed the contract at a loss and then brought suit against its supplier.  Good advice for contract managers would be to expect the best but plan for the worse, and when in doubt, seek legal advice quickly before a problem escalates.

Copyright 2012 James L. Alyea. All Rights Reserved.



Case Study Reference:
“IDENTIFYING CONTRACT RISK AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING” by Jack Horan, Contract Management, Aug., 2009. Retrieved from http://www.mckennalong.com/media/site_files/1140_August%202009.pdf

Saturday, February 11, 2012

Analyzing Wal-Mart's Distribution and Logistics System


Supply Chain Case Study by Jimmy Alyea

As the world’s largest retailer with net sales of almost $419 billion for the fiscal year 2011, Wal-Mart is considered a “best-in-class” company for its supply chain management practices.  These practices are a key competitive advantage that have enabled Wal-Mart to achieve leadership in the retail industry through a focus on increasing operational efficiency and on customer needs     Wal-Mart’s corporate website calls “logistics” and “distribution” the heart of its operation, one that keeps millions of products moving to customers every day of the year.

Wal-Mart’s highly-automated distribution centers, which operate 24 hours a day and are served by Wal-Mart’s truck fleet, are the foundation of its growth strategy and supply network.  In the United States alone, the company has more than 40 regional distribution centers for import flow and more than 140 distribution centers for domestic flow (Logistics, 2011).  When entering a new geographic arena, the company first determines if the area will be able to contain enough stores to support a distribution center.  Each distribution center supports between 75 to 100 retail stores within a 250-mile area.  Once a center is built, stores are gradually built around it to saturate the area and the distribution network is realigned to maximize efficiencies through a process termed “reoptimization” (Troy, 2003).  The result is a “trickle-down” effect:  trucks do not have to travel as far to retail stores to make deliveries, shorter distances reduce transportation costs and lead time, and shorter lead time means holding less safety inventory.  If shortages do occur, replenishment can be made more quickly because stores receive daily deliveries from distribution centers.

The company’s hub-and-spoke distribution network utilizes a system of manufacturer storage with customer pickup.  No inventory is stored at Wal-Mart’s distribution centers.  Wal-Mart’s fleet of 6,500 dedicated trucks and over 50,000 trailers (SC Digest’s editorial staff, 2011) are used to pick up goods directly from manufacturers’ warehouses, thus eliminating intermediaries and increasing responsiveness.  The use of trucks raises transportation costs but is justified in terms of reduced inventory.   Merchandise brought in by truck to distribution centers is sorted for delivery to stores within 24 to 48 hours.  However, certain goods, such as automotive and drug products, are delivered directly to stores by suppliers.  Wal-Mart, a pioneer in the logistics technique of cross-docking, also has store-specific orders packed and shipped directly to the store by the manufacturer. 

Because Wal-Mart’s fast, responsive transportation operations are such a major part of the company’s successful logistics system, great care is taken in the hiring, training, supervising, and assigning of drivers’ schedules and job responsibilities.  From the onset of his retailing career, Wal-Mart founder Sam Walton recognized the importance of hiring experienced people and of building loyalty not only in his customers but also in his employees.  The company hires only experienced drivers who have driven more than 300,000 accident-free miles and whom it believes will be committed to customer service.  Its retail stores are considered important “customers” of the distribution centers.  As stated in the “Private Fleet Driver Handbook” that each driver is given a copy of, drivers are expected to be “polite” and “kind” when dealing with store personnel and others.

In addition to containing a driver’s code of conduct, the Private Fleet Driver Handbook gives instructions and rules for following pre-planned travel routes and schedules, the responsible unloading of a truck trailer at a retail store, and the safe-guarding of Wal-Mart’s property.  For example, although drivers deliver loaded trailers in the afternoon and evening hours, a trailer can be brought to the store’s docks only at its scheduled unloading time.  Because unloading is done at two-hour intervals during the night, a driver is expected to spend the night, returning to the distribution center at a pre-scheduled time with an empty trailer.  Coordinators closely monitor the detailed records of each driver’s activities for adherence to rules.  Violations are dealt with according to handbook procedures, which include employee education to prevent future occurrences of incorrect actions.  By effectively managing every aspect of its transportation operations and treating its drivers fairly, Wal-Mart gets results that are unrivaled in the logistics arena.  This philosophy parallels the successful coaching style of New York Giant’s football coach Tom Coughlin who believes that rules are more than just discipline.  Rules are a key to consistency, which leads to preparedness, which then leads to proper execution (Pennington, 2012).

Copyright 2012 James L. Alyea. All Rights Reserved.

About Jimmy Alyea:

References

Chandran, P. M. (2003).  Wal-Mart’s supply chain management practices. ICFAI Center for Management Research.  Retrieved from www.icmrndia.org

Chopra, S., & Meindl, P.  (2010).  Supply chain management:  strategy, planning, and operation. 4th ed.  Prentice Hall: New York.

Logistics. (2011). Walmartstores.com.  Retrieved from http://walmartstores.com/AboutUs/7794.aspx.

Pennington, B. (2012, January 22). Tom Coughlin goes by the book and wins.  New York Times.  Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/22/sports/football/tom-coughlin-goes-by-the-book-and-wins.html?pagewanted=all

SC Digest’s editorial staff. (2011, October 12).  Wal-Mart tells CSCMP audience it is more flexible on inbound transportation program.  Supply Chain Digest.  Retrieved from http:www.scdigest.com/ONTARGET/11-10-12-1_Walmart_Inbou…

Troy, M. (2003).  Logistics still cornerstone of competitive advantage. Retailing Today.  Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.udh.edu/docprintview/22851744…